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SEMINOLE TRIBE'S IMPACT ON THE ABILITY OF PRIVATE
PLAINTIFFS TO BRING ENVIRONMENTAL SUITS AGAINST
STATES IN FEDERAL COURT
F.J. "RICK" DINDINGER 11*
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the at-
tributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every
State in the Union.'
INTRODUCTION
On March 27, 1996, the United States Supreme Court held in Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida2 that the Eleventh Amendment3 bars suits in federal
courts by Indian tribes seeking to enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act4 against states. The ramifications of this holding extend beyond the
Seminole Tribe facts. Indeed, the Court's decision potentially extends to
all federal statutes enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause' power, which
purport to create federal court jurisdiction over states, among them the
many environmental statutes governing mining, oil and gas, and other
resource development.
This article evaluates the ability of private citizens or organizations
to sue states in federal court for violations of federal environmental
laws.' Suits to enforce environmental laws, particularly those involving
state actors, often define and refine the scope and application of such
laws, thereby establishing the exact environmental requirements with
which industry must comply.' Part I of this essay provides a focused re-
view of the Eleventh Amendment, noting that Congress may abrogate a
* Associate, Bums, Figa & Will, Denver, Colo. B.S., 1989, University of Colorado; M.A.,
1994, Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary; J.D., 1997, University of Denver College of Law.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
5. U.S. CONST. ar. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. This essay does not address the ability of the United States to bring such a suit. Federal
jurisdiction in such cases comports with Article Il's authorization of judicial review of all
controversies "to which the United States shall be a Party." U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2; see Seminole
Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.14 (stating that the federal government may sue states in federal court and
suggesting that this ability ensures the states' compliance with federal law) (citing United States v.
Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892)).
7. Cf. Sierra Club v. Public Serv. Co., 894 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Colo. 1995) (private citizen suit
to enforce the Clean Air Act); Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Romer, 796 F. Supp. 457 (D. Colo. 1992)
(private organization seeking state government enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act).
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state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in certain circumstances. Part II
analyzes these circumstances in light of the Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe and examines the Seminole Tribe standard for evaluating federal
court jurisdiction over suits against states. Part III applies this standard to
environmental statutes and concludes that private plaintiffs generally
cannot sue states in federal court. Finally, Part IV discusses three excep-
tions which enable private plaintiffs to circumvent Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
PART I: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial Power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or eq-
uity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State."
While the amendment's language speaks only of suits by citizens from
other states, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted it to preclude
all suits against a state in federal court.9 The Court has also extended its
bar to prohibit suits against local governmental divisions if the state re-
mains "the real party in interest."
10
The Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar is not absolute. A
state may waive its immunity and consent to suit in federal court." In
addition, the Ex parte Young'2 doctrine allows plaintiffs to sue individual
state officials in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief to stop
continuing violations of federal law.'3 Finally, under some circumstances,
Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity."
The Eleventh Amendment potentially applies to all actions brought
against states under environmental laws. On its face and as consistently
interpreted, the amendment serves to prevent any such suit brought in
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in 1798, five years after
the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalU.) 419 (1793) (holding that
Article I1 permitted suits against a state by citizens of other states). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment
provides an example of a constitutional amendment overturning a Supreme Court decision.
9. Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973) (stating
that under the Eleventh Amendment, "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal
courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state"); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890) (barring a citizen from bringing suit against his own state in federal court).
10. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d
992, 994 (10th Cir. 1993). The state is "the real party in interest" whenever "the judgment sought
would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration, or
if the effect of the judgment would be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to
act." Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
11. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); see infra Part IV.B.
12. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
13. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48, at 308-11(5th ed. 1994); see
infra Part IV.A.
14. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (discussing Congress's power to abrogate state
immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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federal court by environmentally concerned citizens and environmental
organizations. Nevertheless, if one of the exceptions to Eleventh
Amendment immunity applies, states may still be susceptible to these
private environmental suits.
PART II: THE SEMINOLE TRIBE DECISION
Prior to Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court permitted Congressional
abrogation of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in two instances."
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,'6 the Court authorized abrogation whenever Con-
gress legislates pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"
since the enforcement provisions of Section 5 "necessarily limited" ante-
cedent constitutional provisions.8 In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,'9
the Supreme Court recognized congressional power to abrogate immu-
nity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause"0 on the theory that the
Commerce Clause granted Congress similar power as Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2'
The Seminole Tribe Court addressed these two instances and held
that Union Gas improperly extended Fitzpatrick in permitting abrogation
of Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Commerce Clause.22 In
Fitzpatrick, the Court relied on the rationale that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment limited state authority possessed under preceding constitutional
provisions and thereby altered the existing balance between state and
federal power. 3 According to Seminole Tribe, however, this rationale
cannot serve to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under the
Commerce Clause since the Eleventh Amendment came after the Com-
merce Clause in time and, therefore, worked to expand state authority at
the expense of Congress' Commerce Clause powers. ' In addition to this
"last-in-time-controls" rationale, the Court noted that the Fourteenth
Amendment contains express terms intended to limit a state's power
while the Commerce Clause contains no such language.' Consequently,
15. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1996).
16. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
17. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "The Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5.
18. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
19. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116. Ct. 1114(1996).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
21. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20.
22. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996).
23. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455. The Seminole Tribe Court stated that the Fitzpatrick decision
permitted congressional abrogation because the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered "the
balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125.
24. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
25. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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the Seminole Tribe Court expressly overruled Union Gas and restored
Eleventh Amendment immunity to statutory schemes created by Con-
gress pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 6
A. The Union Gas Decision
The plurality in Union Gas found congressional authority to abro-
gate Eleventh Amendment immunity under Commerce Clause legisla-
tion, specifically the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1990 (CERCLA).' Under CERCLA, the
United States government sued Union Gas Company for cleanup costs at
a dismantled coal gasification plant. 9 Union Gas filed a thi'rd-party com-
plaint against the state of Pennsylvania on grounds that the Common-
wealth was an "owner or operator" of the plant, and Pennsylvania sought
dismissal of that complaint on grounds that Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity barred the suit.0
In Union Gas, the plurality first evaluated whether CERCLA clearly
expresses an intent to hold states liable.' Under CERCLA, liability may
extend to "persons" and "owners or operators."32 CERCLA's definition
of "persons" explicitly includes "states"33 and the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)3" provides that states are "owners
or operators."3 The Union Gas plurality stated that these definitions con-
veyed "a message of unmistakable clarity: Congress intended that States
be liable along with everyone else for cleanup costs recoverable under
CERCLA."3
After concluding that CERCLA permits suits against states in fed-
eral court, the Court analyzed whether the Commerce Clause granted
Congress the power to enact such a statute." The plurality first observed
26. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131.
27. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20. Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion. Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan. Justice White provided the fifth vote for
the holding but wrote separately to express his disagreement with "much of [the plurality's]
reasoning." Id. at 45 (White, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). White believed that
CERCLA's inclusion of states within the definition of "persons" was insufficient to constitute an
"unmistakably clear" expression of congressional intent to abrogate immunity. Id. at 45-48.
Nevertheless, he considered and voted on the issue of whether Congress possessed power under the
Commerce Clause to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity since "a majority of the Court
conclude[d] otherwise." Id. at 45.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
29. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 7.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
34. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
36. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 8.
37. Id. at 13.
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that part of state sovereignty was surrendered with the United States
Constitution's grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce." It
then drew an analogy to the Fitzpatrick Court's abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment and ruled that
Fitzpatrick applied to CERCLA since both the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment expand federal power while contracting state
power.9 Finally, the plurality noted the need for congressional solutions
to environmental problems. ' Based upon these factors, the Union Gas
plurality held that Congress possesses authority pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause to render states liable."
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Ken-
nedy, dissented in part. '2 Justice Scalia's dissent acknowledged that Con-
gress intended for CERCLA to render states "liable to private persons for
money damages." 3 However, Justice Scalia declared this intent, even
with CERCLA's textual imposition of liability upon states, insufficient to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.' Justice Scalia's position
stemmed, fundamentally, from the rationale that "state immunity from
suit in federal courts is a structural component of federalism, and not
merely a default disposition that can be altered by actions of Congress
pursuant to its Article I powers."
B. The Seminole Tribe Decision
In Seminole Tribe, the Court critically focused on Union Gas.' In
the period between these two decisions, four of the five justices com-
prising the Union Gas plurality left the Court" and one new justice
joined.' Consequently, Seminole Tribe provided the Union Gas dissent-
ers with the opportunity to reverse the earlier decision.
The decision involved a suit against Florida for its failure to negoti-
ate with the Seminole Tribe as required under the Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act (IGRA). '9 Congress passed the IGRA pursuant to the "Indian
Commerce Clause,"' which vests Congress with plenary authority over
Indian commerce and Indian tribes.' The IGRA seeks to provide "a
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id. at 16-17.
40. Id. at 20-21 ("The general problem of environmental harm is often not susceptible of a
local solution.").
41. Id. at 23.
42. Id. at 29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 38.
46. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125-28 (1996).
47. These Justices included Brennan, Marshall, White and Blackmun.
48. Justice Thomas joined.
49. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
51. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1126 (discussing the nature of the Indian Commerce Clause).
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statutory basis for operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments." 2 It requires tribes to obtain a state's cooperation
prior to operating casino-style gaming" and requires states to negotiate
"with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter such a compact. ' Finally, it
expressly authorizes tribes to sue states in federal courts if a state fails to
conduct such negotiations in good faith."
Florida moved to dismiss on grounds that the case violated the
state's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. ' After the district
court denied Florida's motion,"' the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding
that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit. In part to resolve a split
between the Eleventh Circuit's decision and contrary decisions by the
Eighth,59 Ninth,' and Tenth6' Circuits, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision by holding that none of
the powers conferred by Article I of the Constitution authorize Congress
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.62
The Supreme Court reached its decision by applying a two-pronged
conjunctive test. Under the first prong of the test, the Court determined
that Congress unequivocally expressed an intent to abrogate states' Elev-
enth Amendment immunity.63 The Court analyzed the IGRA's provision
authorizing tribes to sue states and the provision describing the remedial
scheme available to tribes that file such suits and concluded that these
provisions "make it indubitable that Congress intended through the Act
52. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
53. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
54. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
55. The IGRA states: "Mhe United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over-(i) any
cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into
negotiations with the Indian tribe for purposes of entering into a Tribal-State compact ... or to
conduct such negotiations in good faith." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A).
56. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1121.
57. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 663 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 11 F.3d 1016
(1lth Cir. 1996), aff d, 116 S. Ct. 1114(1996).
58. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1028 (11th Cir. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996).
59. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 281 (8th Cir. 1993) ("We
believe the express provision for federal jurisdiction over claims under the IGRA is sufficient to
abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity.").
60. Spokane Tribe v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the State of
Washington is not immune from suit under the IGRA).
61. Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir. 1994) ("We conclude that the
Indian Commerce Clause empowers Congress to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity and that IGRA constitutes an unequivocal expression of Congress' intent to do so.").
62. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114,1131-32 (1996).
63. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1123-24. The Court cited Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68
(1985), and Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985), for the proposition that




to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit." The Court
reached this conclusion without requiring a specific statutory reference to
the Eleventh Amendment, signifying that Congress need not refer ex-
plicitly to the amendment in a statute in order for that statute to enjoy the
requisite intent to abrogate a state's immunity."
Once the Court made a positive determination under the test's first
prong, it then addressed whether Congress acted "pursuant to a valid
exercise of power," and evaluated whether the Commerce Clause em-
powered Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.67 The
Court stated that Union Gas stands as the only case recognizing such
power68 and concluded that no principled distinction exists between the
Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause." This
conclusion resulted in the Court's complete review of the Union Gas
decision.
The Court, after completing its review of Union Gas, decided to
explicitly overrule the former decision.' The Court reached its decision
by relying on the position that the Eleventh Amendment limited federal
courts' Article I jurisdiction by barring all suits by any citizens against
any state.7' Although the amendment's text speaks only of suits against a
state by citizens from other states, the Seminole Tribe majority relied on
stare decisis from Hans v. Louisiana2 for the proposition that the
amendment bars all suits against states.73 Hans prohibited a private citi-
zen's suit against a state in federal court even though the citizen sought
to sue his own state." The Seminole Tribe Court essentially concluded
that Hans recognized a penumbra of sovereign immunity in the amend-
ment's text which extends beyond the text's plain language. 5 Therefore,
Congress cannot authorize suits against states pursuant to statutes passed
64. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124.
65. Id. In Union Gas, the Court also reached the conclusion that Congress clearly intended to
abrogate a state's immunity despite the fact that in CERCLA, Congress does not explicitly refer to
the Eleventh Amendment. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989).
66. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124.
67. Id. at 1125-32.
68. Id. at 1125.
69. Id. at 1127.
70. Id. at 1128.
71. Id. at 1127.
72. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
73. The Court, believing Union Gas was wrongly decided, disregarded stare decisis with
respect to the Union Gas decision. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127-28.
74. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
75. The majority stated that "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates
which limit and control." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1129 (citing Monoco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
313 (1934)). In Union Gas, Justice Scalia characterized Hans as standing for the idea that "the
Eleventh Amendment was important not merely for what it said but for what it reflected: a consensus
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity for States... was part of the understood background against
which the Constitution was adopted." Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31-32 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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under the Commerce Clause since this clause antecedes the Eleventh
Amendment and its penumbra.7 ' As such, the Court held that the IGRA's
attempt to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity failed.
77
The dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe, like the Union Gas plu-
rality, disagreed with the broad principle of sovereign immunity derived
from Hans. Justice Stevens stated that Hans departed from the language,
purpose, and history of the Eleventh Amendment,78 while Justice Souter
flatly stated that Hans "was wrongly decided."79 To these Justices, the
Eleventh Amendment's text should control instead of the Hans principle
of broad immunity.' The dissenters assert the amendment only bars di-
versity actions brought by a citizen of one state against another state.8'
Consequently, the Seminole Tribe dissent would have permitted federal
jurisdiction since the suit involved a citizen from Florida suing the state
of Florida.2 In the same vein, the Union Gas plurality permitted a citizen
from Pennsylvania to sue the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and both
dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe and the Union Gas plurality would
have permitted the suit brought by Hans against his own state.
PART Il: APPLICATION OF SEMINOLE TRIBE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES
The Seminole Tribe decision applies to all Commerce Clause stat-
utes which permit citizen suits against states in federal court. Many envi-
ronmental statutes contain "citizen suit" provisions that permit private
76. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32. The discussion above relating to Seminole Tribe's
rejection of Fitzpatrick's applicability to suits brought under the Commerce Clause explains why an
antecedent constitutional provision cannot abrogate the immunity vested by the Eleventh
Amendment. See supra Part 11.
77. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32. For more detailed analysis of majority's rationale,
see Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's
Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213 (1996) and Henry Paul Monaghan,
Comment, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARv. L. REv. 102 (1996).
78. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1153 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1152 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Because the plaintiffs in
today's case are citizens of the State that they are suing, the Eleventh Amendment simply does not
apply to them.").
81. Id. at 1136 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the "Eleventh Amendment's
jurisdictional restriction is best understood to apply only to suits premised on diversity jurisdiction").
Justice Scalia himself apparently agrees with this interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment's text.
See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that if the amendment's
text were intended as a comprehensive description of state sovereign immunity in federal courts--
that is, if there were no state sovereign immunity beyond its precise terms-then it would
unquestionably be most reasonable to interpret it as providing immunity only when the sole basis of
federal jurisdiction is the diversity of citizenship that it describes. Id. But see Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997) (stating that "the dignity and respect afforded a State, which the
immunity is designed to protect, are placed in jeopardy whether or not the suit is based on diversity
jurisdiction").
82. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1152 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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parties to sue violators of those environmental statutes.83 If these provi-
sions fail to survive the Seminole Tribe decision, private citizens will
retain few judicial avenues by which to impede abuses of natural re-
sources by state actors. Indeed, "[a]bsent a citizen suit statute, environ-
mentally concerned citizens cannot effectively enforce pollution laws or
combat environmental degradation."'
A. Intent to Abrogate
The precise language of the various environmental citizen suit pro-
visions differ. Still, most of these provisions authorize any "person" to
bring a suit against any "person" who violates the statute. Of the statutes
defining "person," only the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act's definition excludes states;" the remaining statutes define person to
include states." For example, the Clean Air Act states:
[Any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-(1)
against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged ... to be in
violation of [the Clean Air Act] ... [t]he [U.S.] district court shall
have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties.8
The Clean Air Act defines person to include "an individual, corporation,
partnership, association, State, municipality, political division of a State,
and any agency, department, or instrumentality of the United States and
any officer, agent, or employee thereof." Thus, under the Clean Air Act's
plain language, private citizens may sue states in federal court. Further, in
Union Gas, the Court held that CERCLA's citizen suit provision mani-
fested congressional intent to hold states liable.89 Since CERCLA's citizen
suit provision mirrors other environmental citizen suit provisions, the Su-
preme Court appears to agree that the plain language of these provisions
83. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2619 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997);
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994)); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994); Noise Control Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4911 (1994); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-
8 (1994).
84. Peter H. Lehner, The Efficiency of Citizens Suits, ALB. L. ENVrL. OuTLOOK, Fall 1995, at
4.
85. 30 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
86. Karl S. Coplan, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws--The Citizen Suit
Provisions, SA85/3 ALI-ABA 1033, 1040 (1996); see also United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio,
503 U.S. 607, 617 (1922) ("[B]oth the CWA and RCRA define 'person' to cover States,
subdivisions of States, municipalities, and interstate bodies.").
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(1994).
88. Id. § 7602(e).
89. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 8 (1989); see supra Part II.A.
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demonstrates congressional intent to abrogate state immunity from suits by
private citizens in federal court.
B. Power to Abrogate
The second prong of the Seminole Tribe standard requires courts to
ascertain whether Congress, in enacting environmental citizen suit provi-
sions, possesses the power to override Eleventh Amendment immunity.'
Seminole Tribe, standing alone, clearly appears to impede citizen suit
provisions to the extent that they authorize suits against states in federal
court. This conclusion is bolstered by the application of Seminole Tribe
by various courts considering non-environmental statutory schemes and
the current philosophical trends affecting Supreme Court decisions.
1. Application of Seminole Tribe to Non-Environmental Statutory
Schemes
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)9 serves to prevent dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities. The ADA satisfies the
first prong of the Seminole Tribe test by containing a clear and unequivo-
cal expression of Congress' intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment im-
munity.
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of [the ADA]. In any
action against a State for a violation of [the ADA], remedies (includ-
ing remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a viola-
tion to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a vio-
lation in any action against any public or private entity other than a
State.
93
Several courts agree that Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment im-
munity under a proper exercise of authority when it passed the ADA.9'
This agreement derives, in part, from Congress' stated purpose "to in-
voke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to en-
force the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce." '95 This alone
does not satisfy the second prong of the Seminole Tribe test since the
90. See supra Part I.B.
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
92. Id. § 12101(b).
93. Id. § 12202. CERCLA and the IGRA contain less overt expressions than those in the
ADA, yet the Union Gas and Seminole Tribe decisions recognized that those statutes satisfy
Seminole Tribe's first prong. Nevertheless, future environmental legislation might incorporate
similar language as in the ADA to avoid any potential debate regarding congressional intent to
abrogate immunity.
94. See, e.g., Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914, 917 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Mayer v. University of
Minn., 940 F. Supp. 1474, 1479-80 (D. Minn. 1996); Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F. Supp. 1497, 1501
(E.D. Mich. 1996).
95. 42U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
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question of the constitutionality of congressional action does not depend
upon express recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.' Nev-
ertheless, these courts discerned that ADA's purpose to prevent discrimi-
nation of disabled people comported with the Fourteenth Amendment's
broad purpose of preventing an array of discrimination.' If one could
establish that environmental laws eliminate discrimination, then one
might satisfy Seminole Tribe."' However, the traditional environmental
statutes serve no such purpose, and it is unlikely that any court will ex-
tend the abrogation found under the ADA to environmental laws.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)' serves to
prevent discrimination based on age in an employer's treatment of its
employees or prospective employees. Two recent cases adopt the posi-
tion that Congress intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
when it passed the ADEA."0 This position derives from the inclusion of a
"State and any ... agency or instrumentality of a State"'" in the ADEA's
definition of "employer."' 3 Thus, the ADEA satisfies the first prong of
the Seminole Tribe test.
The two cases split on the issue of whether Congress possessed
power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when it passed the
ADEA. MacPherson found ADEA's "bedrock" in the Commerce Clause
and ruled that abrogation under the ADEA was improper.'" The Mac-
Pherson court relied on EEOC v. Wyoming,"5 in which the majority left
open the question of whether the ADEA was a valid exercise of congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause." The Wyoming dissent and
concurrence, however, agreed that the ADEA was not and could not have
been passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.'" According to the
MacPherson court, the Wyoming majority's reluctance to decide the is-
sue, coupled with the dissent's agreement with the concurrence, provided
96. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144(1948).
97. See Niece, 941 F. Supp. at 1503-04.
98. See Terry Carter, EPA Steps in to Clean the Air, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 32-33 (reporting
that students at the Environmental Law Clinic at Tulane Law School have recently argued that the
location of a $700 million plastics and chemical plant in St. James Parish, a community which is 80
percent African-American, amounts to environmental racism).
99. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
100. Id. § 630(b).
101. See Teichgraeber v. Memorial Union Corp., 946 F. Supp. 900,906 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating
that Congress clearly and unequivocally abrogated immunity); MacPherson v. University of
Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785, 787 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (concluding that Congress "clearly and
unmistakably intended to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity").
102. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
103. MacPherson, 938 F. Supp. at 787.
104. Id. at 789.
105. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
106. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243.
107. Id. at 250-51.
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"one of those rare instances where a dissenting opinion provides a more
useful statement of law.'''°
The court in Teichgraeber v. Memorial Union Corp.,'" on the other
hand, stated that Congress acted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
when it passed the ADEA and upheld the Act's abrogation of
immunity."' The Teichgraeber court stated that without a direct Supreme
Court decision to the contrary, it was bound by a Tenth Circuit decision
holding that Congress enacted the ADEA pursuant to its powers "under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.""' Essentially, MacPherson
appears to emphasize the ADEA's impact on commerce and employers
and thus finds the ADEA's origins in the Commerce Clause. Teichgrae-
ber, in contrast, seems to focus on the ADEA's impact on employees and
thus finds the ADEA's origins in the Fourteenth Amendment's protec-
tion of citizens.
The split described above illustrates that congressional power to
abrogate state immunity when it passes environmental statutes may be-
come an issue which percolates in divided lower courts and ultimately
requires further Supreme Court review. If so, private plaintiffs will have
succeeded in at least convincing some lower courts that Congress passed
environmental laws pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment (i.e., to
eliminate discrimination) and that the bar to private environmental suits
contained in Seminole Tribe against states is not absolute.
A third non-environmental statutory scheme is the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA),"2 an act Congress passed in 1938 to protect workers
from substandard wages and oppressive working hours."3 Several courts
applying Seminole Tribe to the FLSA concur that Congress intended to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting the FLSA" and
recognize that Seminole Tribe prohibits congressional abrogation of a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity through the exercise of Com-
merce Clause powers. The cases then evaluate whether the FLSA derives
from congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Of these cases, several summarily dismiss any notion that the
FLSA derives from the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby uphold state
108. MacPherson, 938 F. Supp. at 788.
109. 946 F. Supp. 900 (D. Kan. 1996).
110. Teichgraeber, 946 F. Supp. at 906.
111. Id. (analyzing Hurd v. Pittsburgh State Univ., 29 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1994)).
112. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
113. Id. § 202.
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (actions "may be maintained against any employer (including a
public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction"); 29 U.S.C. § 203(x)
(defining "public agency" as "the Government of the United States; the government of a State or
political subdivision thereof; any agency of... a State; or any interstate governmental agency").
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immunity."' The rationale for such dismissals derives from acknowledg-
ing that United States v. Darby"6 unequivocally recognized that Congress
enacted the FLSA pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers"' and that
the FLSA's language declares that Congress enacted the statute pursuant
to the Commerce Clause."8 These dismissals indicate that federal courts
generally follow the Seminole Tribe bar to suits against states involving
statutes passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Thus, the Fourteenth
Amendment stands as the only constitutional provision by which plain-
tiffs may sue states to enforce environmental laws in federal court.
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit recently held that the Equal Pay
Act,"9 a 1963 amendment to FLSA, derives from the Fourteenth
Amendment.'2° The rationale for this holding involved congressional in-
tent to eliminate gender-based discrimination when it passed the Equal
Pay Act. This rationale prompted the Sixth Circuit to find that the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in Fitzpatrick'2' "applies with equal force to the
extension of the Equal Pay Act to the States."'2
This case suggests that citizen suits against states for environmental
law violations might survive the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional
bar if a private plaintiff can succeed in establishing that environmental
statutes fall within the guise of the Equal Protection Clause.'23 The pri-
vate plaintiff might argue that all citizens should enjoy the protection
gained from environmental laws and that if a state violates an environ-
mental law, and thereby causes certain citizens to be deprived of the
benefits afforded by that law, such violation denies Equal Protection to
those citizens.
A final non-environmental statutory scheme is the Patent Act.'24 The
Act clearly demonstrates congressional intent to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity and thus satisfies the first prong of the
Seminole Tribe test.' At least one case held and a second case suggested
that this abrogation comports with congressional power under the Four-
115. See Rehberg v. Department of Public Safety, 946 F. Supp. 741, 743 (S.D. Iowa 1996);
Chauvin v. Louisiana, 937 F. Supp. 567, 570 (E.D. La. 1996); Blow v. Kansas, 929 F. Supp. 1400,
1402 (D. Kan. 1996).
116. 312U.S. 100(1941).
117. Darby, 312 U.S. at 114-15.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1994) ("It is declared to be the policy of this chapter, through the
exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign
nations....").
119. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
120. Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997).
121. See discussion supra Part I.
122. Timmer, 104 F.3d at 841.
123. See infra Part IV.C (discussing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
124. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
125. Id. (stating that no state or state instrumentality is immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment).
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teenth Amendment.'26 These courts focus on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause which prohibits states from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.'27 The dis-
trict court in College Savings Bank observed that Section 5 empowers
Congress "to enforce all the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
including the Due Process Clause" and found that patents are "property"
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.'28 Thus, the court found con-
gressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims
under the Patent Act.
These Patent Act cases provide a possible avenue for circumventing
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Namely, a party seeking to sue a state
in federal court might characterize his or her interest in the state's com-
pliance with an environmental law as a property interest. If this charac-
terization succeeds, the principle from College Savings Bank suggests
that Congress possesses the power under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause to abrogate immunity. Although this argument re-
mains untested, private parties certainly enjoy grounds for asserting that
environmental laws affect their property.'29 For example, the Clean Air
Act and Clean Water Act prevent dangerous particles from contaminat-
ing real property; if states break these laws it might result in decreased
property values or a total loss of property. Violations of these acts might
also result in the death of livestock that might graze on contaminated
land or drink polluted water. By the same token, property adjacent to a
Superfund site may lose value if the responsible party fails to comply
with his or her cleanup responsibilities. As such, the owner of the adja-
cent property appears to possess a property interest in the responsible
party's compliance with CERCLA.
2. Current Ethos Supporting State Rights
The cases applying Seminole Tribe to the ADA, the ADEA, the
FLSA, and the Patent Act, offer several arguments supporting an abro-
126. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp.
400, 425-26 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims under the Patent Act); Genentech v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 643 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment applies but
finding no property right in the case at hand).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The cases which found congressional power to abrogate
immunity under the ADA, ADEA, and FLSA generally found such power under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
128. College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 425-26.
129. Interview with Todd S. Welch, Supervising Attorney at Mountain States Legal
Foundation, in Denver, Colo. (Jan. 22, 1997); see also Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of
Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1116 (10th Cit. 1991) ("A property interest protected by the due process
clause results from a legitimate claim of entitlement created and defined by existing rules or
understanding that stem from an independent source such as state law."). But see Chauvin v.




gation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of environ-
mental statutes. Before predicting how the Supreme Court might enter-
tain these arguments, one must recognize that the current philosophical
trend affecting Supreme Court decisions supports state rights at the ex-
pense of congressional legislation.
Three cases in six years suggest the Supreme Court is strengthening
state sovereignty while it diminishes the authority of Congress. In Semi-
nole Tribe, the Court struck down the IGRA's suit provision on grounds
that states enjoy immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. °
In United States v. Lopez,'3' the Court struck down a federal law banning
handguns in local school zones.' 2 The Lopez Court reasoned that Con-
gress' Commerce Clause authority did not extend to purely local matters
and that "[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense
an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substan-
tially affect any sort of interstate commerce."'33 Lopez strengthens state
sovereignty by limiting the ability of Congress to regulate local affairs
under the auspices of the Commerce Clause. In New York v. United
States,'" the Court struck down a federal statute on Tenth Amendment
grounds. The amendment's text states that "[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."'35 Prior to New York, the Tenth
Amendment rarely was used to invalidate federal legislation. Thus, New
York strengthens state sovereignty by giving the Tenth Amendment re-
newed viability and by restoring the notion that certain powers are re-
served and uniquely held by the states.
Two cases recently decided by the Supreme Court further reinforce
this trend. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe" involved a suit by a Native
American tribe against the state of Idaho to quiet title to submerged lands
within the boundaries of the tribe's reservation.' The tribe claimed that
its ownership extended to the banks and submerged lands of a lake and
various rivers and streams pursuant to the original boundaries of the
Coeur d'Alene Reservation. "' The state argued that it acquired ownership
of the submerged lands upon its statehood in 1890 under the equal foot-
ing doctrine.' 9 The district court dismissed the tribe's claim on grounds
130. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996); see supra Part II.B.
131. 514U.S. 549 (1995).
132. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
133. Id. at 567.
134. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The Court stated that "[wie have always understood that even where
Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts." New York, 505 U.S.
at 166.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
136. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
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that the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims against Idaho and its
agencies.'" The Ninth Circuit reinstated the claim, holding that state offi-
cials' continued enforcement of laws would violate the tribe's rights if
the tribe owns the submerged lands."' However, the Supreme Court, in a
five-to-four decision, held that the suit was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and that the Ex parte Young doctrine could not serve to cir-
cumvent the amendment.'"2 In Printz v. United States, 3 law enforcement
officers from Montana and Arizona challenged a provision of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act'" that required state law enforcement
officers to conduct checks on prospective handgun purchases.' 5 Follow-
ing the Court's holding in New York that Congress cannot compel States
to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program, Printz held that "[t]he
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those
of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regula-
tory program."'"
At a minimum, these cases reflect the Supreme Court's commitment
to re-examine federalism. The consistency of the five cases indicates that
the re-examination will result in a strengthening of state rights. Indeed,
Steven G. Calabresi, professor of law at Northwestern University, stated
that these cases "mark the beginning of a quiet revolution in American
constitutional law."'47
PART IV: OTHER AVENUES BY WHICH TO SUE STATES IN FEDERAL
COURT
Seminole Tribe acknowledges the availability of other avenues for
plaintiffs seeking to sue states in federal courts." Thus, while arguments
premised on abrogation should fail, arguments premised on these excep-
tions to the Eleventh Amendment's reach may succeed. If so, private
party plaintiffs may continue invoking the citizen suit provisions con-
tained in environmental laws to bring actions against states in federal
court.
140. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1452 (D. Idaho 1992), rev'd in part, 117
S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
141. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd in part, 117 S.
Ct. 2028 (1997).
142. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2043; see infra Part IV.A (discussing the Ex parte
Young doctrine).
143. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
144. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922-924 (1994).
145. Printz, 117 S, Ct. at 2369.
146. Id. at 2384.
147. Steven G. Calabresi, A Constitutional Revolution, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1997, at A14.




A. The Ex parte Young Doctrine
The Ex parte Young doctrine results from a Supreme Court decision
permitting suits against state officials seeking injunctive relief, 9 based
on the idea that "the power of federal courts to enjoin continuing viola-
tions of federal law is necessary to vindicate the federal interest in as-
suring the supremacy of that law."'1" For a suit to fall within the Ex parte
Young doctrine's contours, the plaintiff must satisfy two criteria: (1) the
suit must seek a remedy for a continuing violation of federal law, and (2)
the suit must seek prospective and declaratory or injunctive relief."' Con-
sequently, plaintiffs seeking to enforce state violations of, or failure to
enforce federal environmental laws, must not sue the state per se, but
instead an official of the state. Furthermore, the suit must seek to end a
continuing violation of the federal environmental law; one time viola-
tions and past violations fall outside of Ex parte Young. Finally, the suit
cannot seek monetary damages from the state.' 2 Instead, the suit may
only seek state cessation of its violation of the law.' 3
Seminole Tribe cast doubt upon the continued viability of the Ex
parte Young doctrine. The Court held that Ex parte Young does not apply
to suits under the IGRA since the statute "prescribed a detailed remedial
scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created
right."'54 Thus, if the statute refers in detail to a suit against a state, courts
following Seminole Tribe should exercise restraint in implying authori-
zation for suits against state officials.'55 Although the applicability of this
holding to environmental remedial schemes remains unclear,'" Ex parte
Young suits against state officials for failure to follow environmental
laws appear to remain viable. This viability derives from the lack of re-
peated and exclusive references in environmental remedial schemes to
"the State."'' 7 Further, footnote seventeen of Seminole Tribe states that
149. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
150. In re SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
151. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,68 (1986).
152. See Hafer v. Melo, 520 U.S. 21, 30 (1991) (noting that the Exparte Young doctrine "does
not apply where a plaintiff seeks damages from the public treasury").
153. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2043 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Conner
stated:
The Young doctrine recognizes that if a state official violates federal law, he is stripped of
his official or representative character and may be personally liable for his conduct; the
State cannot cloak the officer in its sovereign immunity. Where a plaintiff seeks
prospective relief to end a state officer's ongoing violation of federal law, such a claim
can ordinarily proceed in federal court.
Id.
154. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. at 1132 (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. Interview with Colin C. Deihl, Staff Attorney of Earthlaw, in Denver, Colo. (Jan. 22,
1996). Deihl believes that the applicability of the Seminole Tribe Court's analysis to remedial
schemes provided by environmental laws remains uncertain. According to Deihl, the Supreme Court
may need to offer further clarification of this issue in a future decision.
157. See supra Part III.A (discussing the language of environmental citizen suit provisions).
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the remedy created by the IGRA "stands in contrast to the statutes cited
by the dissent as examples where lower courts have found that Congress
implicitly authorized suit under Ex parte Young." ' The dissent cited one
environmental statutory scheme, the Clean Water Act (CWA),"9 as an
example.'" Thus, footnote seventeen implies that the CWA's remedial
scheme survives the Seminole Tribe limitation to the Ex parte Young
doctrine. Most environmental citizen suit provisions mirror the CWA'6'
and thus should fall within footnote seventeen.
The Strahan v. Coxe'62 court applied Seminole Tribe's footnote sev-
enteen to the Endangered Species Act (ESA)'63 and stated that the IGRA
"stands in contrast" to statutes "authorizing suits against any person who
is alleged to be in violation of the relevant Act."" This statement empha-
sizes that remedial schemes which do not exclusively refer to states fall
outside of the Seminole Tribe limitation on Ex Parte Young. The court
then observed that the ESA's citizen suit provision broadly permits any
person to enjoin any person who violates the ESA.'6" Presumably, this
finding permitted the court to then imply authorization for suits against
state officials. Finally, the court held that "Ex parte Young, even as re-
fined by Seminole Tribe, continues to provide an exception from the
Eleventh Amendment for lawsuits [by private parties] under the ESA."'"
The implication from Strahan, coupled with the implication dis-
cussed above regarding footnote seventeen, leads to the conclusion that
Ex parte Young authorizes suits in federal court by private citizens seek-
ing to enforce state compliance with environmental laws. This conclu-
sion is bolstered by the similarity of language between the ESA and
CWA, and other environmental citizen suit provisions.'67 Thus, so long as
environmental statutes do not repeatedly and exclusively refer to states,
they fail to fall within the Seminole Tribe limitation upon Ex parte
Young.
The Court's Coeur d'Alene Tribe decision extensively discussed the
Ex parte Young doctrine. The principal opinion acknowledged that the
doctrine is a fiction and "an exercise in line-drawing."'" The principal
opinion then held that quiet title actions against states, which implicate
158. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 n.17.
159. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997).
160. Id. at 1183 n.63 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter also cited the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (1994), as an example.
161. See discussion supra Part IHI.A.
162. 939 F. Supp. 963 (D. Mass. 1996), affidin part and vacated in part, 1997 WL 613017 (1st
Cir. Oct. 9, 1997).
163. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
164. Strahan, 939 F. Supp. at 982 (citations omitted).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra Part LI.A.
168. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2039 (1997).
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special sovereignty interests, fall outside of Ex parte Young even though
the requested relief in such actions is prospective." Thus, the case does
not directly clarify the doctrine's application to environmental suits.
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy suggested that a case-by-case analysis
should apply to future Ex Parte Young determinations.'7 ° Under this pro-
posed analysis, courts should evaluate whether a state forum is available
to hear the dispute, the nature of the federal right implicated in the dis-
pute, and whether special factors might apply.' This analysis might af-
ford guidance to private plaintiffs seeking to invoke Ex Parte Young;
however, the Court did not adopt it, and its application remains uncer-
tain.
B. States' Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
A state's ability to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity pro-
vides a second avenue by which plaintiffs may sue states in federal
courts. In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,' the Supreme Court
stated: "There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to the
reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a State waives its
immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar the action."'' Thus, a state may consent to suits in federal
court by private citizens to enforce violations of environmental laws.
Cooperative federalism, by which a state receives federal money in re-
turn for taking actions which would otherwise appear antithetical to the
state's interests,'74 supplies one reason a state might consent to such suits.
Courts impose a stringent test for ascertaining whether a state has
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.' A state's consent to suit in
its own courts does not constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity.' 6 Nevertheless, such consent provides a viable avenue for plain-
169. Id. at 2040-47.
170. Id. at 2039.
171. Id. at 2054.
172. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
173. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238; see also Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2033 (stating that
the Eleventh Amendment "enacts a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit
on the federal judiciary's subject matter jurisdiction").
174. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the
Constitution, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 205 (1997).
175. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241 (observing that the test is "stringent"); Port Authority
Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (stating that courts have adopted a
"particularly strict standard").
176. See, e.g., Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1044 (10th Cir. 1988) (observing that a
state's waiver of immunity, or consent to be sued in the state court, did not constitute a waiver as to
actions brought in federal court). The mere fact that a state enters into a contract or agreement with
the federal government is insufficient to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity in federal court.
See Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (holding that
an agreement by the state to explicitly obey federal law in administering a health program does not
constitute an express waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
673 (1974) (stating that general authorization for suit in federal court is insufficient). Finally, the
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tiffs to sue states for violations of environmental laws. Despite the vi-
ability of this avenue, several negatives potentially exist. State courts
might not possess the level of expertise enjoyed by federal courts with
respect to environmental laws.'" Furthermore, state courts might demon-
strate hostility toward plaintiffs seeking to sue states since the courts are
instrumentalities of the party being sued.'78
Courts find waiver "only where stated 'by the most express lan-
guage or by such overwhelming implication[] from the text as [] leave[s]
no room for any other reasonable construction." 'i 79 "[I]n order for a state
statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, it must specify the State's intention to subject
itself to suit in federal court."'" Thus, if a state citizen suit statute only
provides for suits against the state in state court, such a statute is insuffi-
cient for bringing suits against the state in federal court. Indeed, suits
against states in federal court are prohibited unless a state's statute or
constitutional provision unambiguously waives Eleventh Amendment
immunity.'8 ' Consequently, plaintiffs seeking to enforce environmental
laws against a state in a federal forum must evaluate the state's waiver to
ascertain whether or not the state clearly consented to such suits.
Colorado offers an example of a state which fails to pass the strin-
gent test for waiver. The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA)
waives Colorado's defense of state sovereignty in limited
circumstances.'" Unfortunately for environmental plaintiffs, the CGIA's
plain text offers no language indicating that Colorado intended to waive
its Eleventh Amendment immunity.' Accordingly, the CGIA "does not
effect a waiver of the state's constitutional immunity to suit in federal
court"''M and plaintiffs may not sue Colorado in federal court to enforce
environmental laws.
federal government cannot require states to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (stating that one of the restrictions on congressional
ability to attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds requires Congress not to run afoul of other
constitutional provisions in the process).
177. Id. at 34 (noting that thirty-eight.states have some form of judicial election).
178. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION 33-38 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the
issue of parity).
179. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171
(1908); see also Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239-40; Welch v. Department of Highways & Pub. Transp.,
483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987). Silence alone is clearly insufficient. See Mascheroni v. Board of Regents,
28 F.3d 1554, 1560 (10th Cir. 1994).
180. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241.
181. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 495 U.S. at 306.
182. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (1997).
183. Id.
184. Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1044 (10th Cir. 1988).
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C. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
In Fitzpatrick, the Supreme Court specifically held that Congress
may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity when legislating
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Seminole Tribe held
that Congress' power under Section 5 cannot serve to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the Commerce Clause,'" and no court has
suggested that Section 5 serves to abrogate immunity under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Conse-
quently, environmental plaintiffs face a difficult hurdle before they can
invoke Section 5 and sue states in federal court, namely, the hurdle of
establishing that Congress passed environmental laws pursuant to Four-
teenth Amendment powers. Environmental laws intuitively fall outside
of the Fourteenth Amendment's original purpose of eliminating racial
discrimination.'87
One might advance the argument that environmental laws serve to
eliminate discrimination,'" fall within the Equal Protection Clause,' 9 or
create property interests under the Due Process Clause. '" These argu-
ments are admittedly attenuated. Furthermore, no environmental statutes
indicate congressional intent to exercise Fourteenth Amendment powers.
Although this in of itself is not fatal,'9 ' a recent Sixth Circuit decision
noted that all legislative schemes upheld under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment concerned race or gender discrimination by state ac-
tors.'" As such, suits against states under Section 5 should not succeed.
Nevertheless, no court has specifically ruled that Section 5 cannot serve
to abrogate immunity and plaintiffs might at least advance the suggested
arguments.
185. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); see discussion supra Part I; see also
Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 208 (6th Cir. 1996) ("It is settled that the Eleventh
Amendment does not limit the effectiveness of legislation passed pursuant to Congress's power
under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
186. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996). See discussion supra Part lI.
187. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126 (1970) ("Above all else, the framers of the
Civil War Amendments intended to deny to the States the power to discriminate against persons on
account of their race.").
188. See supra Part lIl.B.1.
189. See supra Part llI.B.1.
190. See supra Part II.B.1.
191. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983). The Court stated:
It is the nature of our review of Congressional legislation defended on the basis of
Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that we be able to discern
some legislative purpose or factual predicate that supports the exercise of that power.
That does not mean, however, that Congress need anywhere recite the words 'section 5'
or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or 'equal protection.'
Id.
192. Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir. 1996).
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CONCLUSION
Seminole Tribe employed a two-pronged conjunctive test for evalu-
ating whether federal courts enjoy jurisdiction over suits against states.
Essentially, a court first must determine whether Congress unequivocally
expressed an intent to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
If so, a court then needs to determine whether congressional power ex-
isted to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. A statute survives only
if it satisfies both prongs.' 3
Seminole Tribe created a serious impediment to the ability of plain-
tiffs to sue states in federal court for violations of environmental laws.
Although most environmental laws pass the first prong of the Seminole
Tribe standard for evaluating whether federal courts enjoy jurisdiction
over suits against states, they fail the second prong. Until the Supreme
Court's composition changes, the Court will adhere to its Seminole Tribe
decision and prohibit suits against states in federal courts. When Con-
gress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause it lacks constitutional
authority to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Since
Congress passed environmental laws pursuant to this clause, plaintiffs
clearly cannot sue states in federal court. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court will not accept the argument that Congress passed environmental
laws pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, arguments
construing environmental laws as creating property interests, furthering
the goal of eliminating discrimination, or creating Equal Protection
rights, will fail. This conclusion stems from the realization that these
arguments serve to diminish state rights while the Court's current incli-
nation is to strengthen state rights.
Fortunately for plaintiffs, Seminole Tribe's footnote seventeen en-
sures the continuing viability of the Ex parte Young doctrine for suits
against state officials for violations of environmental laws. Furthermore,
plaintiffs may have opportunity to sue states in federal court under the
waiver doctrine. Finally, this essay suggests that plaintiffs might bring
environmental suits against states under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment but admits that such suits may not succeed.
193. At least one federal appellate and bankruptcy court and several federal district courts have
since applied the Seminole Tribe standard. See Timmer v. Michigan Dep't. of Commerce, 104 F.3d
833, 837 (6th Cir. 1997); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
948 F. Supp. 400 (D.N.J. 1996); Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. Supp. 659, 662 (D. Md. 1996);
Mayer v. University of Minn., 940 F. Supp. 1474, 1477 (D. Minn. 1996); MacPherson v. University
of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785, 787 (N.D. Ala. 1996); Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F. Supp. 1497, 1501
(E.D. Mich. 1996); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Burton, 949 F. Supp. 1546, 1552 (D. Wyo. 1996);
Headrick v. Georgia, 203 B.R. 805, 807 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996).
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